

Also, a bill (H. R. 19810) granting an increase of pension to Tapley T. Dodge; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19811) granting an increase of pension to Robert N. Jessop; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. WINGO: A bill (H. R. 19812) granting an increase of pension to George W. Tilman; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By Mr. ASHBROOK: Papers to accompany H. R. 11029, for relief of William Cagney; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BAILEY (by request): Petition of I. S. Miller and A. & I. Hoover, of Newry, Pa., and A. S. King, J. G. Gousman, and E. H. & B. Claar, of East Freedom, Pa., favoring H. R. 5308, to tax mail-order houses; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BRITTEN: Memorial of Painters' Local Union, No. 275, of Chicago, Ill., urging Congress to prohibit the exporting of all food products to Europe; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, memorial of Local No. 143, International Union of Steam and Operating Engineers of Chicago, Ill., urging the passage of the Hamill bill, H. R. 5139; to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

By Mr. CARR: Petition of citizens of Uniontown, Rockwood, Point Marion, Connellsville, Berlin, Meyersdale, Garrett, Confluence, Urside, Fairchance, all in the State of Pennsylvania, favoring passage of H. R. 5308, taxing mail-order houses; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, petition of members of Local No. 520, N. A. L. C., of Uniontown, Pa., favoring the passage of the Hamill bill (H. R. 5139); to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

By Mr. CARY: Petition of Milwaukee (Wis.) Typothetae, relative to abolishing free printing of stamped envelopes; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. DALE: Petition of Western Association of Short Line Railroads, protesting against the passage of H. R. 17042 or S. 6406; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. FESS: Petitions of Esther Ganse and Rev. Joseph Shepherd, of Westboro, Ohio, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. FITZGERALD: Memorial of sundry citizens of Brooklyn, N. Y., favoring the passage of the Hamill bill, relative to retirement of aged employees of the Government; to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

By Mr. GARDNER: Petition of H. M. Buckley and 18 other citizens, of Newburyport, Mass., favoring bill barring certain publications from the mails; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. GERRY: Petitions of Frank Watson, N. B. Gardner, W. H. Lane, J. C. Brown, J. L. Batterman, J. F. Deering, G. W. Fraser, W. H. Randall, W. A. Taylor, I. W. Brayton, J. H. Stutz, Philip Shippee, R. F. Spencer, G. R. La Flash, Arthur Seymour, C. E. Wilbur, Jr., C. E. Wilbur, Sr., J. R. Cochran, E. C. Wilbur, Chester P. Winsor, and S. K. Goff, all of North Scituate, R. I.; Mrs. L. A. Lathrop, Mrs. Helen M. C. Kendrick, Miss Ellen M. Pabodie, Mrs. M. F. Humphrey, Miss M. E. Dray, Mrs. H. J. Roworth, Miss Cynthia Potter, Miss Mary Mackie, Mrs. L. H. Barton, and Mrs. F. A. Bliss, all of Providence, R. I., urging the passage of legislation providing for national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

Also, petitions of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Carolina, R. I.; W. M. Burgess, W. E. Spencer, A. L. Sprague, W. A. Atwood, S. E. Hopkins, D. I. Cutler, E. P. Shippee, J. C. Worden, Jr., R. T. Franklin, H. M. Arnold, Benjamin Wood, Pierre Carrier, Lester H. Blanchard, Walter Phillips, Dewey Paul, G. H. Potter, Preston Potter, A. E. Borden, Fred Erleech, Mrs. F. J. Erleech, C. O. Geer, E. M. Spencer, D. S. Bishop, J. H. Hutchinson, B. W. Randall, George Gardner, K. A. Grover, V. T. Dimitroff, A. K. Brison, and W. E. Turpee, all of North Scituate, R. I., urging the passage of legislation providing for national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. GORDON: Petition of certain citizens of Ohio, favoring a national referendum vote on restriction of immigration; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. GUERNSEY: Petition of citizens of Maine, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island: Petition of 275 citizens of Woonsocket, R. I., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. LAFFERTY: Petition of Knights of Columbus of Astoria, Oreg., asking that charges of cruelty in Mexico made by Theodore Roosevelt be investigated by Congress; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. LINDQUIST: Petition of sundry citizens of the eleventh congressional district of Michigan, favoring the passage of House bill 5308, relative to taxing mail-order houses; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, petition of citizens of Brinton and of Ottawa County, Mich., protesting against the Sunday-observance bill; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Also, petition of 40 citizens of Breckenridge, 75 citizens of Ithaca, 40 citizens of Morley, and other citizens, all of the State of Michigan, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. LLOYD: Petition of residents of first congressional district of Missouri, favoring passage of House bill 5308, relative to taxing mail-order houses; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MCGILLICUDDY: Petition of sundry citizens and organizations of the State of Maine, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. MANN: Petition of Western Association of Short Line Railroads, protesting against the passage of House bill 17042 or Senate bill 6406; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of citizens of Chicago, Ill., favoring Senate resolution for Government ownership of electrical means of communication; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. MOON: Petition of H. F. Burns and others, of Copperhill, Tenn., in support of prohibition amendment; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. MOORE: Memorial of Young Friends' Association, held at Newton, Pa., protesting against any increase in armaments, fortifications, or armies; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of Branch No. 113, Catholic Knights of America, protesting against the ill treatment of Catholics and sisters in Mexico; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. NEELY of West Virginia: Papers to accompany House bill for the relief of Jens Musgrave; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. SCULLY: Petition of 110 members of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Navesink, N. J., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. TAVENNER: Petition of Woman's Christian Temperance Union of Silvia and 116 citizens of Nanvoo, Ill., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. THACHER: Resolutions adopted by Second Baptist Church, Second Congregational Church, Marshfield Hills; Christian Endeavor, Marshfield; Advent Christian Church, Memorial Methodist Episcopal Church, Plymouth, all in the State of Massachusetts, favorable to nation-wide prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. WALLIN: Memorial of common council and sundry citizens of Schenectady, N. Y., favoring the passage of the Hamill bill, H. R. 5139; to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

SENATE.

FRIDAY, December 11, 1914.

The Chaplain, Rev. Forrest J. Prettyman, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, all of Thy blessings wait upon Thy changeless and eternal law. Thou hast made known Thy will to us and all that Thou hast made. The earth about us and the heaven above us speak of the infinite purposes of God in man. We desire to make this land the transcript of the divine purpose. We pray for that grace and knowledge of Thy will whereby we may be workers together with God. Make this land after the pattern Thou hast revealed to us in Thy holy word. We ask for Christ's sake. Amen.

COE I. CRAWFORD, a Senator from the State of South Dakota, and JAMES K. VARDAMAN, a Senator from the State of Mississippi, appeared in their seats to-day.

The Journal of yesterday's proceedings was read and approved.

CREDENTIALS.

Mr. LANE presented the credentials of GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN, chosen by the electors of the State of Oregon a Senator

from that State for the term beginning March 4, 1915, which were read and referred to the Committee on Privileges and Elections.

MEMORIALS.

Mr. KERN presented memorials of sundry pupils of the Assumption School of Indianapolis, Ind., remonstrating against the transmission of anti-Catholic publications through the mail, which were referred to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE.

Mr. PERKINS, from the Committee on Commerce, to which was referred the bill (S. 6028) to authorize the Commissioner of Navigation to cause the rebuilt bark *Simla* to be registered as a vessel of the United States, reported it without amendment and submitted a report (No. 832) thereon.

Mr. BANKHEAD, from the Committee on Commerce, to which was referred the bill (S. 6829) to provide for the construction of two revenue cutters, reported it without amendment and submitted a report (No. 833) thereon.

BILLS INTRODUCED.

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. CHAMBERLAIN:

A bill (S. 6882) to reclassify the clerks and messengers of the mobile army and promote their efficiency; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. NELSON:

A bill (S. 6883) to amend section 3928 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads.

By Mr. CUMMINS:

A bill (S. 6884) granting an increase of pension to Emanuel Klepper (with accompanying papers);

A bill (S. 6885) granting an increase of pension to Hiram W. Babcock (with accompanying papers);

A bill (S. 6886) granting an increase of pension to George W. Carpenter (with accompanying papers); and

A bill (S. 6887) granting an increase of pension to William W. Olmsted (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. KERN:

A bill (S. 6888) granting an increase of pension to Joanna E. Kiley (with accompanying papers);

A bill (S. 6889) granting an increase of pension to Frederick Schnetzer (with accompanying papers);

A bill (S. 6890) granting a pension to Nettie Johnson (with accompanying papers);

A bill (S. 6891) granting a pension to Jeremiah C. Foley (with accompanying papers);

A bill (S. 6892) granting an increase of pension to Barnet Hauver;

A bill (S. 6893) granting an increase of pension to Thomas B. Prather;

A bill (S. 6894) granting a pension to Isabella J. Loser;

A bill (S. 6895) granting a pension to Florence S. Myers;

A bill (S. 6896) granting an increase of pension to Anderson Myers; and

A bill (S. 6897) granting a pension to Rose Anna Nagley; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. SMOOT:

A bill (S. 6898) granting an increase of pension to Theodore M. Burge (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. LANE:

A bill (S. 6899) granting a pension to Allen E. Pugh;

A bill (S. 6900) granting an increase of pension to J. S. Herndon; and

A bill (S. 6901) granting a pension to Eugene Helm (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. BURLEIGH:

A bill (S. 6902) granting an increase of pension to George Carpenter; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. OWEN:

A bill (S. 6903) granting an increase of pension to Cleora A. Carver (with accompanying papers); and

A bill (S. 6904) granting an increase of pension to Samuel L. Hess; to the Committee on Pensions.

REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION.

Mr. GRONNA submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (H. R. 6060) to regulate the immigra-

tion to and the residence of aliens in the United States, which was ordered to lie on the table and be printed.

SOIL SURVEY OF NEW ORLEANS AREA, LOUISIANA.

Mr. THORNTON submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 498), which was read and, with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Printing:

Resolved, That there shall be printed 1,000 copies of the Soil Survey of the New Orleans area, Louisiana, for the use of the Senate document room.

STANDING COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE.

Mr. JONES. Mr. President, I merely wish to give notice that next Wednesday after the routine morning business is disposed of I shall submit some remarks on Senate resolution 398, rearranging the committees of the Senate, and also on Senate joint resolution 163, fixing the salaries of the clerks and messengers to committees of the Senate. I especially invite the attention of the members of the Committee on Rules, to which committee these resolutions have been referred, to this matter.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The morning business is closed and the calendar under Rule VIII is in order.

MILITARY RESERVE.

Mr. WEEKS. Mr. President, in accordance with the notice which was previously given by my colleague [Mr. Lodge], I propose to address the Senate on the subject of a military reserve.

It is natural that when most of the civilized world is engaged in warfare that there should be solicitude and inquiry on the part of our citizens as to our means to defend ourselves in case of necessity. We have been spending large amounts of money on account of previous wars and to maintain the reasonable but very modest organizations which go to make up our Army and Navy. At this time it does not seem to me that it is wise or prudent to take any action which will change our policy or add to our naval equipment except by an omnibus appropriation which can be expended under the direction of the general board of the Navy with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy and the President.

The European war will undoubtedly demonstrate very many things which have been subjects of controversy in the immediate past. We know even now that while flying machines have not proven important destructive agencies, that they have easily demonstrated that they are of the greatest importance and value as scouts both on land and sea.

For many years there has been doubt and controversy about the value of the submarine. Even at this time we may feel confident that the submarine has demonstrated that it is an extremely important agency in the defense of a harbor or for aggressive action against hostile vessels near the home port or coast of the submarine.

We do not know how important the battleship is going to be in future warfare, but it has certainly been demonstrated that the very fast cruiser armed with a few high-powered guns is going to exert a marked influence in any future war.

The character of naval material development in the future must regulate the number of personnel required; and therefore at this time I have no disposition to discuss even that phase of our naval situation, except to say that, based on the experience of the past, our Naval Establishment is in a class with that of Germany and France and probably second only to that of Great Britain. The effectiveness of the Navy is going to depend on the quality of the personnel and the spirit which it displays. In this respect I am confident that no Navy excels our own. Having some familiarity with its personnel during the past 35 years, I think I can say with confidence that from the standpoint of efficiency it has never stood higher than at the present time.

On the other hand, it has been apparent to nearly everyone familiar with our needs that our military establishment could be greatly strengthened without materially increasing its cost. We have a large number of men who leave the Regular Establishment after serving one enlistment or who leave the militia under similar conditions or those who are connected with schools and colleges where military training is undertaken, all of whom might be combined into a military reserve which would be of vital importance and assistance to our relatively small Army. I hope, as do all citizens of the United States, that when this war is ended nations will see the folly of maintaining such great military establishments as European countries have done and that a general agreement may be made which will provide for at least a partial disarmament and result in a limitation to expenditures for military purposes. This war should be conclusive enough to show the folly of following the course of the

past, and if it results in so doing it will not be necessary for us to increase our military establishment in any form and we may not find it necessary to increase the Naval Establishment which we are now maintaining. That may be an idle dream, but the prayers of every good American citizen should be that this may be the last of the great wars which are going to involve civilized countries, and that reason—along the lines of arbitration, consideration for the rights of others, compromises, and so forth—may adjust the causes which have led to all wars, including the present one. However, such a result may not be obtained, and it is the part of wisdom and duty for us to consider our own condition and what course it will be advisable for us to follow in case peace is made on such terms that a recurrence of military upbuilding is to take place in Europe.

There seems to be a disposition in the press, at least, to urge publicity and a thorough examination of our condition. There is, however, little force in these suggestions. Anyone may learn about our Military or Naval Establishment by reading the reports of the Secretaries of the departments and the reports of those who are conducting the different bureaus and branches of the service. It is an open book to all citizens, and there need be no doubt about our relative position or our capabilities if one is disposed to study reports. In fact, there is and has been altogether too much publicity in such matter, in my judgment. We have had a demonstration during the present European war of the value of secrecy in conducting military operations, and there is no reason why we should spread broadcast what we are doing or what preparations we have made. I have no doubt every European country is informed in the most minute detail of our condition both on land and sea, and if any change in our methods is to be made it should not be in the direction of greater publicity, but should be to protect our operations even in time of peace from scrutiny both at home and abroad.

There has been one other requirement clearly brought out by the European war which to my mind was conclusive before existing hostilities, but it has finally been given a demonstration which must convince anyone interested in the subject, and that is the necessity of providing more officers in proportion to our military forces authorized or under enlistment. It is reported that one-sixth of the English officers who have gone to the front have been disabled, and presumably most of the competent officers of Great Britain are already engaged, so that in providing the large number of men which are now being equipped and trained for service the question of officers is of vital importance.

We should without any delay graduate from West Point at least twice as many cadets as are now being graduated, not by lowering the standard but by increasing the number of appointments. It would be an excellent investment for the country even if we are not likely to be engaged in a war for many years, because a large percentage of the graduates could be put on a reserve list as soon as they had left the Military Academy, and as such they could become connected with the existing militia organizations and greatly improve their standing and efficiency.

Our first line of defense under present conditions is our militia, which varies greatly in efficiency in different States, depending on the support which it receives.

The poet Crabbe said many years ago, after viewing an encampment of the English militia:

And raw in fields the rude militia swarms,
In peace a charge, in war a weak defense.

In justice to the militia it should be said it is infinitely more reliable in these days than in those to which I have just made reference, and I think it is fair to say that the militia forces of the United States were never as efficient as they are to-day; but even under the best conditions it takes time and effort to get a militia force into the field, as is demonstrated by the many weeks which have been required by Great Britain in forwarding its territorials to the battle front, and while our position would give us greater time to prepare for attack than that of European countries, we should develop the auxiliary military forces so that in case of need we would have available a large army of partially seasoned men. I know there are those who will say this will develop a military spirit and that it may be the reason for our getting ourselves involved in hostilities. I do not think that reasoning is sound, and I am confident that the young man who has had a military training in school, in the militia, or in a reserve is a better citizen and a more efficient citizen than he would have been if he had never had such training. I have followed such activities with a great deal of

interest for many years, and my conclusion is that among the best elements that go to make up our active life are regularity, good health, and discipline, all of which are developed and increased by even a minimum military training, always assuming that this experience is obtained under the direction of competent officers.

It is my purpose at this time to discuss some phases of a military reserve. My reason for doing this, however, is not entirely because of the war which is now embroiling most of Europe, for I had partially prepared this statement before the war commenced.

I have not arrived at these conclusions without consultation with many of the universally recognized competent and up-to-date officers of our Army, so that these ideas, it seems to me, are entitled to the consideration of the Military Committees and might well serve as a basis for legislation.

It is contended with much force that development and commercial expansion will be resisted by other nations; that national policies which are injurious to the interests of other nations will be resisted by the nations adversely affected; that there are certain vital questions affecting the honor or life of a nation which neither diplomacy nor international courts can settle; and that in the future, as in the past, every nation which would live and grow may be called upon to fight.

There are even those who proclaim that force will ever cease to be a potent factor of national life is a Utopian dream; that while man is virile and nations develop and increase in power and wealth there will be wars. Such people claim that the history of a nation is written in the history of its armies and navies; that as long as these are sufficient to enforce its policies the nation grows.

If these theories are sound, it follows that when a nation refuses to make the sacrifices which are needed to develop its military resources into an adequate defense, and to maintain this development ever potent, it drops into insignificance and finally dies.

The founders of this Nation evidently believed that national defense is one of the cardinal duties of statesmen, and the Constitution provided that Congress should give the Nation this defense.

Gen. Richard Henry Lee, who commanded the Partisan Legion in the Revolution, said:

A government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength mechanized by education and disciplined for battle.

We had a good example of the results of assembling large forces of untrained men under officers of insufficient experience in the hospital and death rolls of the Spanish-American War.

A large body of untrained and unorganized men aggregated together has manifestly no chance of success against a modern army, and a nation which pins its faith upon this sort of defense is courting certain disaster on the field of battle.

If a nation attempts to develop its military resources at all it must provide an army and navy entirely adequate for its defense, for if it stops short of this and spends large sums in developing and maintaining an army or navy which has not a reasonable chance of success against a probable foe the moneys so spent are wasted.

Quoting from the report of the Chief of Staff, 1912:

An army is an expensive machine maintained in order to support national interests in time of emergency. The economic efficiency of an army should therefore be measured by the effective fighting power which it is proposed to develop and maintain in war. It must not only be able to develop a high fighting efficiency at the outbreak of war, but it must be able to maintain that efficiency during the progress of the campaign. As soon as war begins military forces are subject to heavy losses, and unless means are definitely provided for replacing these losses the military machine will immediately deteriorate.

It is the experience of modern warfare that any given unit loses 50 per cent of its strength in the first six months of war. If this loss is not replaced, there is 50 per cent deterioration in the power of the unit, and if it is replaced by raw men the quality of the force as a highly trained team is destroyed.

This problem has an important economic aspect that has been ignored throughout our military history. Military forces are maintained at great expense through long periods of peace in order to meet a brief emergency in war. Sound economics therefore demands that the peace expenditure be justified by unquestioned war efficiency.

There may be differences of opinion concerning the size of the army which a nation must support, but there are no differences among experts concerning the organization of the army and the manner in which it can be most economically and effectually maintained.

The following figures give for 1912 the population of the more important foreign nations, the peace strength of their armies, and the strength of trained men of the great reserves which

make and keep effective in war the armies they maintain in peace:

	Population.	Strength of Army—peace.	Reserves.
France.....	39,600,000	536,000	3,000,000
Germany.....	64,900,000	566,000	4,700,000
Austria.....	47,800,000	343,000	3,000,000
Russia.....	118,700,000	771,000	5,400,000
Italy.....	34,700,000	211,000	1,500,000
Japan.....	51,600,000	183,000	1,300,000
Great Britain.....	45,300,000	206,000	215,000
United States.....	99,000,000	{ 159,000 + 121,000 }	Nona.

¹ Regulars.

² Militia.

The above-named countries have trained and available for service in war—France, 1 man in every 10.7 of population; Germany, 1 man in every 11.7 of population; Austria, 1 man in every 12.4 of population; Russia, 1 man in every 18.2 of population; Italy, 1 man in every 18.5 of population; Japan, 1 man in every 40.8 of population; Great Britain, 1 man in every 103.3 of population; United States, 1 man in every 511 of population.

In all of these countries except England the reservists are unpaid, because such countries believe that there are sufficient economic advantages to the Nation to justify a general military education to its youth, and consequently military service is compulsory. In England, on the other hand, enlistment is voluntary, and accordingly she pays her reservists, as must necessarily any country in which compulsory service does not exist.

In France the liability to serving extends from 20 to 45 years of the citizen's age. Service with the colors is compulsory, and, until recently, was two years for all arms. After serving with the colors the men pass into the reserve of the active army, in which they serve for 11 years, during which time they are subject to two periods of instruction, one for 23 days and the other for 17 days. From the reserve of the active army the men pass to the territorial army, in which they serve for six years, subject to one period of seven days' instruction. The final service is with the reserve of the territorial army, and this service is for six years, the men receiving no training, but are subject to muster.

In Germany the service is compulsory, and liability extends from 17 to 45 years of the citizen's age. Until recently service with the colors was three years with the cavalry and horse artillery and two years for the other arms. After serving with the colors the men pass into the reserve, in which they serve 4 years and 6 months or 5 years and 6 months, according to the arms of the service. During their service in this reserve the majority of the men are seldom held longer than for a 20-day period of instruction.

Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland are confronted with conditions similar to our own. They are opposed to compulsory service, but the soldiers they have trained become a part of their developed military strength.

In three days Switzerland mobilized 200,000 perfectly equipped fighting men, most of whom are fair shots and all of whom are accustomed to using the army rifle. At the end of three days these four army corps were ready in every particular of organization, equipment, and transport to march against an enemy. In addition to this force, she can form a reserve of 300,000 men, part of whom have served their time with the active army and 50,000 of whom are always armed. In 1908 Switzerland had about 3,559,000 inhabitants; in 1910 the United States had more than 92,000,000. In 1910 Switzerland spent approximately \$8,099,765 for her military establishment; in 1909-10 the United States military establishment cost \$101,262,069; in other words, Switzerland is paying about two and a half times as much per capita as we are to maintain her military establishment.

With the exception of the United States, every great nation of the world has appreciated the fact that a certain class of its citizens must, while young, be trained in the use of arms at a minimum expense to the nation and, as soon as trained, passed into a great reserve where they can in peace pursue their ordinary occupations, and yet from which they may be taken with certainty in time of war and used as part of the effective defense of their country.*

The United States is the only nation of any prominence which has no scientific means of developing economically and maintaining efficiently its military resources.

There are two questions which are of importance to any nation supporting an army: First. Is the army of such a size and

organization as will make it reasonably effective against a probable foe? If it will not furnish the defense expected, the nation will be defeated in war, and the machine is worthless and remains worthless until so organized and brought to such strength as will give the desired and expected defense. Second. Is the army maintained at the minimum cost and maximum efficiency?

The military experts of this country and of all other countries where adequate defense is provided are a unit in saying that this can best be done by establishing and maintaining a system of reserves.

In considering, then, the question of interest to this Nation in appropriating moneys for the Army, we naturally turn first to the size of the army which the country needs. The War Department states that this country will need in war a force of 500,000 regulars and militia and from 100,000 to 200,000 volunteers.

The following facts are taken from Upton's Military Policy of the United States—F. L. Huidekoper's book:

Never in our history have we been thoroughly prepared for war. To employ untrained personnel is always dangerous and very expensive.

In the Revolution we used 231,771 regulars and 161,007 militia and volunteers against England's 150,605.

In the War of 1812 we had 56,032 regulars and 471,622 militia against the English and Canadian forces of only about 55,000 men.

In the Mexican War 31,024 regulars and 73,532 militia were required to conquer about 46,000 Mexicans.

In the Civil War the United States employed 67,000 regulars and 2,605,341 militia and volunteers to defeat about 1,000,000 Confederates.

In the Spanish-American War we were compelled to use 58,688 regulars and 223,235 militia or volunteers to subdue 200,000 Spaniards.

How many Americans have any conception of the outrageous extravagance in men and money that has characterized our past wars? How long would any properly run corporation or company tolerate any such mismanagement?

From 1791 to 1911 our War Department has cost \$6,845,129,239 and the pensions \$4,115,829,223.

And this vast sum for pensions is due principally to the same causes which have made us always unsuccessful in our wars—short term of service and untrained volunteers, hastily raised, badly officered, and badly supplied.

As the Nation has decided that the Organized Militia is to form part of its developed military defense, the War Department has included the militia as part of the 500,000 men considered necessary for the first line of defense. Judging from the records of our past wars, as given above, the 500,000 men will be none too many.

The second point to be considered is: How shall the Army determined upon be organized so that it may have the greatest efficiency as a fighting machine at the minimum of cost? In this organization the military experts of all countries are again unanimous.

The organization of divisions and other higher military units is based on the principle that the Army, to be an effective fighting machine, must be proportioned in accordance with its tactical, its sanitary, and its supply needs, and that all units required in war must be organized in peace. It is too late after a fire breaks out to start to organize a fire department, and the same principle applies to an army.

The infantry division is differently organized in different countries, but in all it consists of from 10,000 to 15,000 men armed with rifles, with from 4 to 6 field guns per 1,000 rifles, and with similar definite proportions of cavalry, engineers, signal troops, sanitary troops, and other auxiliaries. The infantry strength is the basis of organization, because it is the cheapest of all the arms to organize and equip and the easiest to obtain, train, and supply. (One thousand cavalry costs to equip and organize about four times what it costs to equip and organize 1,000 infantry, and a battery of light artillery costs about twice as much to equip and organize as 1,000 infantry.)

In every army except our own the number of infantrymen in the division in war remains definite and fixed, because means of replacing losses are provided in time of peace. With us, however, the infantry strength is an absolute variable. We can only predict that the effective strength of each unit will fall after war begins. Under these conditions the division is not a continuing unit. Its components are fluid and indefinite, and there can be no fixed strength of organizations under such conditions.

Most military men admit that our present Army organization is very bad; the War Department has proposed an organization which conforms to what has been adopted by all other first-class powers, but legislation is required to put it into being.

The developed military resources of the United States, so far as the Army is concerned, consists of the Regular Army and the Organized Militia.

A table showing the authorized strength of the Regular Army follows.

Authorized strength of the Army.

	Major generals.	Brig- adier generals.	Colonels.	Lieuten- ant colo- nels.	Majors.	Cap- tains.	First lieuten- ants.	Second lieuten- ants.	Chap- lains.	Total commis- sioned officers.	Enlisted men.
General officers.....	6	15								21	
Adjutant General's Department.....		1	5	7	10					23	
Inspector General's Department.....		1	3	4	9					17	
Judge Advocate General's Department.....		1	2	3	7					13	
Quartermaster Corps.....	1	2	12	18	48	102	280			183	403
Medical Department.....		1	15	24	105	171	50			596	(²)
Corps of Engineers.....		1	13	20	43	54	43		1	225	1,942
Ordnance Department.....		1	6	9	19	25	25			85	735
Signal Corps.....		1	1	2	6	18	18			46	1,212
Bureau of Insular Affairs.....		1	1		1					3	
Fifteen regiments of Cavalry.....			15	15	45	225	225	225	15	765	14,144
Six regiments of Field Artillery.....			6	6	12	66	78	78	6	252	5,513
Coast Artillery Corps.....		1	14	14	42	210	210	210	14	715	18,607
Thirty regiments of Infantry.....			30	30	90	450	450	450	30	1,530	33,107
Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry.....					11	10	10		1	32	591
Military Academy.....			2	5						7	630
Detached officers.....			8	9	27	77	79			200	
Additional officers.....			31	6						37	
Recruiting parties, recruit depots, and unassigned recruits.....											7,000
Service school detachments.....											597
United States military prison guards.....											320
Indian Scouts.....											75
Total Regular Army.....	7	26	164	172	464	1,409	1,425	1,016	67	4,750	84,876
Additional force: Philippine Scouts.....						52	64	64		180	5,732
Grand total.....	7	26	164	172	464	1,461	1,489	1,080	67	4,930	90,608

¹ Under the act of Congress approved Aug. 24, 1912, the 6,000 authorized enlisted men of the Quartermaster Corps are not to be counted as part of the strength of the Army.

² Includes 19 first lieutenants of the Medical Reserve Corps on active duty and 60 dental surgeons.

³ Under the act of Congress approved Mar. 1, 1887 (24 Stat. L., 435), the enlisted men of the Medical Department (Hospital Corps) are not to be counted as part of the strength of the Army. The authorized strength of the Hospital Corps is 3,500 enlisted men.

The Regular Army out of the country can not be considered as available for national defense against invasion; nor can the coast artillermen in the country be regarded as an available part of the mobile defense, for they, and many more besides, will be needed in the seacoast defenses.

The President, under existing laws, can increase the enlisted strength of the Army to 100,000 men, but he can not increase or change the existing number of organizations.

The Regular Army in this country available for mobile defense consists of 31,500 men, including about 10,000 cavalry; and there are no available trained men to expand it to its fighting efficiency in case of war, and this organization is declared to be defective by all military experts.

The Organized Militia in the country available for mobile defense consists of about 104,000 enlisted men, without any available trained men to expand it to its war strength. This force is badly organized tactically and composed largely of men who have less than one year's service, and those who have had one year's service have been given, on an average, not much more

than 48 hours instruction per year in their armories and, perhaps, a couple of weeks in camp. If the military experts are right that the country needs a force of 500,000 trained men supplemented by from 100,000 to 200,000 volunteers to give it a reasonable chance of protection against a probable foe, and that the 500,000 men will be needed at once on the outbreak of war—organized as fighting machines—it would appear that the defense provided at present by Congress is inadequate and practically worthless, and that the moneys spent upon this defense are largely wasted.

The following tables show the organization of the Organized Militia and the Regular Army and the strength of each arm in peace and war. The tables are elaborate and I will not take the time to read them, but will ask unanimous consent that they be incorporated in my remarks.

The VICE PRESIDENT. In the absence of objection, it is so ordered.

The tables referred to are as follows:

Table showing the organization and peace strength of the existing Regular Army within the limits of the United States; the number of organizations which should be added to this existing Regular Army so that it may be tactically organized into 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions; the number of reservists needed to mobilize, and the number of reservists needed to supply depot troops; and casualties resulting from deaths, sickness, desertions and other losses incident to the first 6 months of active campaign.

	Organizations re- quired.	Organiza- tions existing within United States.	Organiza- tions short.	(1)		2)			(3)		(4)	
				Present actual peace strength.		Units which should be organized to give proper tactical organization for 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions.			Peace strength of Regular Army when organized into 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions		War strength of organizations shown in column 3.	
				Officers.	Men.	Unit.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
Infantry regiments for 3 divisions ¹	27 regiments.....	19	8	(51) 969	(859.8) 16,336	8	(51) 408	(870) 6,960	(51) 1,377	(870) 23,490	(51) 1,377	(1,836) 49,572
Cavalry regiments in the United States ²	Regiments.....	12		(53) 636	(839.3) 10,072							
Cavalry regiments for 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions (under proposed tactical reorganiza- tion). ³	8½ regiments.....								(36) 301	(1,012) 9,546	(36) 301	(1,012) 9,546
Field Artillery regiments for 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions.	8 regiments.....	3½	4½	(44) 154	(846) 2,961	4½	(44) 198	(877) 3,947	(44) 352	(877) 7,016	(44) 352	(1,128) 9,024
Engineer battalions for 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions. ⁴	5 battalions.....	2	3	(15) 30	(609) 1,218	3	(15) 45	(638) 1,914	(15) 75	(501) 2,121	(15) 75	(501) 2,121
Signal troops battalions for 3 divisions and 2 Cav- alry divisions. ⁵do.....	3½	1½	(11) 39	(195.1) 683	1½	(11) 17	(198) 297	(11) 56	(198) 990	(11) 56	(198) 990
Ambulance companies for 3 divisions and 2 Cav- alry divisions. ⁶	16 companies.....	3	13	(5) 15	(49) 147	13	(5) 35	(54) 172	(5) 80	(54) 164	(5) 80	(78) 1,248
Field hospitals for 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions. ⁷	13 field hospitals..	3	13	(5) 15	(40) 120	13	(5) 35	(36) 108	(5) 80	(36) 108	(5) 80	(56) 168
Total.....				1,858	31,537		798	14,378	2,321	44,603	2,321	73,397

(See footnotes on following page.)

Table showing the organization and peace strength of the existing Regular Army within the limits of the United States; the number of organizations which should be added to this existing Regular Army so that it may be tactically organized into 5 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions; the number of reservists needed to mobilize, and the number of reservists needed to supply depot troops; and casualties resulting from deaths, sickness, desertions, and other losses incident to the first 6 months of active campaign.—Continued.

	(5) Needed increase of existing Regular Army to give or- ganizations shown in col- umn 3.		(6) Reservists neces- sary to mobilize; difference be- tween columns 3 and 4.		(7) Reservists needed to supply depot troops (10 per cent of war strength) and to supply wastage of 6 months.		Percentages taken.	(8) Reservists needed to supply depot troops (10 per cent of war strength) and to supply wastage of 3 months.		Percentages taken.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.	
Infantry regiments for 3 divisions ¹	408	7,154	0	26,082	688	24,786	40+10=50	550	19,829	30+10=40
Cavalry regiments in the United States ²	Surplus.	Surplus.								
Cavalry regiments for 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions (under proposed tactical reorganization). ³	335	526	0	70	135	4,296	35+10=45	105	3,341	25+10=35
Field Artillery regiments for 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions.	198	4,055	0	72,008	158	4,061		123	3,158	
Engineer battalions for 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions ⁴ ..	45	903	0	70	23	636	20+10=30	19	530	15+10=25
Signal troops battalions for 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divi- sions. ⁵	17	307	0	70	17	297		14	248	
Ambulance companies for 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions ⁶	65	717	0	384	16	250	10+10=20	15	225	8+10=18
Field hospitals for 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions ⁶	65	456	0	320	16	179		15	161	
Total.....	643	13,066	0	728,794	1,053	34,505		841	27,492	

¹ Does not include 1 regiment in Alaska and 2 regiments now in United States but scheduled for service in Hawaii and Panama.

² The figures shown in this line are not included in totals, the tactical organization being admittedly faulty.

² Figures shown in this line show tactical organization of a Cavalry force of approximately the enlisted strength now in United States if organized into 2 Cavalry divisions of 2 brigades of 2 regiments of 6 squadrons of 14 officers and 150 men each.

* Three unmounted battalions of 501 men and 2 mounted battalions of 309 men.

* Three unmounted battalions of 501 men and
 ‡ Does not include 1 company now in Alaska.

* Does not include 1 company now in Alaska.
 * Present authorized strength of Hospital Corps equals 3,500 enlisted men. Actual strength is 590 officers (including 85 Medical Reserve Corps on active duty and 63 dental surgeons). Total strength Hospital Corps needed for 3 divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions (this includes, in addition to the number given in table, all the personnel on duty with troop-) equals 477 officers and 3,743 men, leaving to increase to war strength 32 officers and 243 men.

⁷ When sufficient reserves are accumulated, peace strength of all regular organizations, except Infantry, can be materially decreased in horses and men at great saving, and in column 6 the enlisted strength increased proportionately.

Table showing the organization and peace strength of the existing Organized Militia, the number of organizations which should be added to the existing militia so that it may be tactically organized into 12 divisions and 5 auxiliary divisions and furnish line of communication troops, the number of reservists needed to mobilize, and the number of reservists needed to supply depot troops; and casualties resulting from deaths, sickness, desertions, and other losses incident to the first 6 months of active campaign.

[illegible]

Table showing the organization and peace strength of the existing Organized Militia, the number of organizations which should be added to the existing militia so that it may be tactically organized into 12 divisions and 5 auxiliary divisions and furnish line of communication troops, the number of reservists needed to mobilize, and the number of reservists needed to supply depot troops; and casualties resulting from deaths, sickness, desertions, and other losses incident to the first 6 months of active campaign—Continued.

	(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		Per cent.	(8)		Per cent.
	War strength of organizations shown in column 3.		Needed increase of existing militia to give organizations shown in column 3.		Reservists necessary to mobilize difference between columns 4 and 3.		Reservists needed to supply depot troops (10 per cent of war strength) and supply wastage of 6 months.			Reservists needed to supply depot troops (10 per cent of war strength) and supply wastage of 3 months.		
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.	
Infantry regiments for 12 divisions.....	(51) 5,508	(1,500) 162,000	Infantry, 904.	12,631	210,000 102,408	7,140 .50	210,000 .50	40+10	{ 7,140 .40	210,000 .40	{ 30+10	
Infantry regiments for 5 auxiliary divisions.	765	22,500										
Infantry regiments for line of communication and home troops.	867	25,500										
Cavalry regiments for 12 divisions (79 troops to be organized into 7 regiments).	(53) 636	(1,188) 14,256	Cavalry, 337.	4,628	107,520 14,256 8,784 5,472	3,570	105,000	{ 2,856	84,000	{ 30+10		
Cavalry regiments to be organized.....												
Field Artillery regiments (59 batteries to be organized into 10 regiments).	(44) 1,056	(1,128) 27,072										
Additional Field Artillery regiments to be organized.			Field Ar- tillery, 1,123.	24,401	{ 39,360 29,308 10,052	{ 45% of 2,052 = 923	{ 45% of 53,616 = 24,127	35+10	{ 35% of 2,052 = 718	{ 35% of 53,616 = 18,765	{ 25+10	
12 ammunition battalions for above 24 regiments of additional Field Artillery.	(15) 180	(526) 6,312										
Heavy Field Artillery for 5 auxiliary divisions (10 battalions of 2 batteries each).	(12) 120	(364) 3,640										
4 ammunition battalions for heavy Field Artillery.	(15) 60	(584) 2,336	Engineers + pontoon, 141.	4,006	{ 8,517 5,100 3,417	{ 30% of 312 = 94	{ 30% of 8,496 = 2,549	20+10	{ 25% of 312 = 78	{ 25% of 8,496 = 2,124	{ 15+10	
Engineers—to organize 23 companies into 8 pioneer battalions.	(15) 180	(501) 6,012										
Engineer battalions to be organized.....												
Signal—to organize 23 companies into 12 field battalions.	(11) 132	(207) 2,484	Signal + aero-wire- less, 103.	1,665	{ 3,534 2,910 624	{ 20% of 660 = 132	{ 20% of 10,180 = 2,036	10+10	{ 18% of 660 = 119	{ 18% of 10,180 = 1,832	{ 8+10	
Hospital Corps to organize ambulance companies.	(5) 265	(65) 3,445										
To organize additional field hospitals..	(5) 265	(60) 3,180										
To organize 5 pontoon battalions.....	(15) 75	(501) 2,505	Sanitary, 0+249.	570	{ 2,597	{ 20% of 660 = 132	{ 20% of 10,180 = 2,036	10+10	{ 18% of 660 = 119	{ 18% of 10,180 = 1,832	{ 8+10	
To organize 5 aero-wireless battalions.	(11) 55	(210) 1,050										
Total.....	10,164	282,292										2,608

Mr. WEEKS. The table for the Regular Army shows that to properly organize it into three divisions will require an addition of 8 Infantry regiments, 4½ regiments of Field Artillery or its equivalent in battalions, 3 battalions of Engineers, 1½ battalions of signal troops, 13 ambulance companies, and 13 field hospitals, or an increase of 333 officers and 13,066 men, of which the President can now supply about 10,000 enlisted men.

The peace strength of the Regular mobile army in the United States could then be held at about 2,300 officers and 42,000 enlisted men; and when trained reservists are provided, the strength of the enlisted men serving with the colors in many of the organizations could be materially reduced. For instance, in the Field Artillery at present—because there are no trained reservists, and because the organizations in the Regular Army are so exceedingly below what is necessary for an efficient army—the existing batteries are perforce held at nearly war strength of men and horses. Even this expensive expedient will not make the Field Artillery effective in case of need, because many of the officers and trained men will be, in war, at once diverted from the batteries to form ammunition and supply batteries, as at present none of these are organized.

When a properly trained reserve is provided and the organizations all organized, the number of men in each battery could be reduced from 133 to about 70 and the horses reduced by nearly one-half. The saving in pay of the men alone would give 500 reservists per battery, or two such regiments could be provided for about one-third more than one regiment now costs. The same can be done with the Cavalry, at great saving in pay of men and cost of horses and their feed. As 1,000 Cavalry costs in equipment about four times what it costs to equip 1,000 Infantry, and as a battery of Field Artillery costs about twice as much as 1,000 Infantry, it is important to hold these arms at the minimum enlisted strength; but until trained reservists are available and until all units needed in war are organized, this can not be done. These expensive arms must be kept at nearly war strength—a very costly, uneconomic, and unwise policy.

There are many reasons, however, why these organizations should not be kept in peace at their maximum strength of privates, provided any means can be devised by which the soldier when he is once trained can be passed to a different status, where he does not cost so much to maintain as with the colors, and yet from which he can be surely and promptly returned thereto in case of war. With the exception of the United States and China, all foreign first-class nations have such a scheme—a reserve system.

ECONOMICAL REASONS FOR PROVIDING A RESERVE OF TRAINED MEN.

The cost of maintaining an efficient army is of exceeding interest to any nation, and as business men and the country's representatives we should adopt the methods which will give equal efficiency with the least cost.

There are many charges which must be paid for the soldier serving with the colors—his pay, food, clothing, shelter, light, heat, water, medical attendance, and the overhead charges of the War Department, the supply departments, and of his officers, and—with the mounted man—his horse and its forage. Leaving out all of these charges except the first three, which are fixed and can not be reduced in this country, we find that the monthly average pay is \$17; the food and cooking, \$7; clothing, \$3.20; total, \$27.20 per month, or \$326.40 per year.

Counting all the expenses of the soldier serving with the colors—that is, overhead charges of the various departments, pay of officers, shelter, heat, light, medical attendance, cost of maintaining the expensive posts, transportation, wear of equipment, clothing, pay, food, and so forth—he will, with the present sized Army, cost probably \$600 a year.

It is believed that men can be held in the reserve at from \$36 to \$40 per year. We can keep, then, in the reserve eight men for the same cost as one man can be kept with the colors, counting only his pay, food, and clothing.

From cost alone the enlisted men serving with the colors are then kept at the minimum, and as soon as they are trained they are passed to the reserve which, in most foreign nations,

is composed of several classes. The first class is used to bring existing units from their economical peace to their effective war strength. The second class is used to supply the wastage of active campaign and to furnish troops for depots, supply columns, and so forth.

No nation is rich enough to keep with the colors in peace all of the men she needs as an adequate defense against a probable foe; and, even if it could afford to keep such a professional army, it would be inadvisable to do so.

First. Because these professional soldiers would yearly cost the Government more and more money by continuous service and reenlisted additional pay, and after passing their prime of life would deteriorate as soldiers and finally pass to the retired list, where, while they are worthless as a part of the developed military resource, they yet cost the Government the price of a great many young reservists. After 30 years' service an enlisted man is entitled to retirement at three-fourths of the monthly pay allowed by law in the grade he holds when retired. He is paid \$9.50 per month additional as commutation for clothing and subsistence and \$6.25 per month additional in lieu of quarters, fuel, and light. Most of these men retire as sergeants or with higher grade. The number of men now on the retired list is 3,589. According to data received from the Quartermaster Corps, these men receive pay of approximately \$2,440,520, or each man costs the Government \$680 per year. While I believe that the enlisted man who has served faithfully should be retired and sufficiently well paid to keep him from want, still it appears that the Government has made every effort to induce the enlisted man to reenlist and become a professional or to remain in the service during his active life. This is an expensive and bad policy.

Second. Because after the man is once trained and disciplined there is no advantage to the Government in keeping him in active service. An expensive and uneconomical method is being followed if the soldier is retained in active service (at a yearly cost of \$326) a day over the time necessary to train him and pass him to the reserve where he can be held at a yearly cost of \$40, and where he is in case of war just as valuable a military asset as the man serving with the colors, provided laws are passed which will keep track of the reservist in peace and compel his certain and prompt return to the colors in case of war or upon call by the President.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator, then, whether he advocates conscription?

Mr. WEEKS. Not at all.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. The Senator proposes to continue the present voluntary system, and limit the man's service in the Army. What will retain the man after he has retired from active service?

Mr. WEEKS. The pay he receives as a reservist—\$40 a year, or thereabouts.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Does the Senator think that for \$40 a year a man can be retained in such a relation to the Government?

Mr. WEEKS. That is my judgment, after considerable personal experience and after consultation with others. We have no trouble in Massachusetts, for instance, in keeping our militia organizations full under the limitations imposed by the law, although they are paid nothing, and although they know the conditions under which they will go into the United States service in case of need. I believe many of the men discharged from the military service will be glad to go into the reserve force, receive the \$40 a year, and make themselves liable to call in case of need. They would be the men that would go into active service very largely anyway, and whatever they receive for keeping up their connection with the Army will be so much to the good.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Has the Senator any experience except that militia experience in Massachusetts to justify the belief that for such a trifling sum as \$40 a year a man after he retires to private life, and presumably has family relations and business connections, would still hold himself constantly in readiness for service?

Mr. WEEKS. Mr. President, I discuss some phases of the question which the Senator has just asked later in this paper; but nobody can have any actual experience, because there never has been anything just like this. Every country that has a reserve force imposes compulsory service, and we can not tell just exactly what would be the result or how much money would be required to carry it out; but these are the estimates which are made by competent officers, and they accord with my judgment after many years' experience in the regular and militia service.

Mr. LODGE. Do not the English pay their territorials? They have no compulsory service.

Mr. WEEKS. They have no compulsory service. I am not sure whether they pay the territorials or not. I am inclined to think they do make some payment to them.

Mr. LODGE. In that connection, is it not true that these volunteer camps have been in large part composed of men who have gone to the camps in the summer at their own expense?

Mr. WEEKS. Oh, yes; and they very seldom receive any compensation for the service in any form. They take their annual vacation of two weeks and devote substantially all of it to the military service without any compensation whatever.

Third. The time the reservist is serving with the colors takes him away from his wage-earning capacity. It is true that while being trained as a soldier he is also being made worth more commercially by having instilled into him the ideas of discipline, punctuality, and by having developed his sense of responsibility; but, so far as the Government is concerned, when he is trained to take his place in the reserve he should at once be returned to his wage-earning capacity, just as the boy in school or college is withdrawn from labor producing only during the time necessary to make of him a greater wage earner, or, in other words, to fit him to do effectively the class of work which may be demanded of him. The contention, then, that the time men are being trained in the Army is a loss to the Nation because it removes them from productive labor is not any more tenable than would be the claim that it is economically a waste to a nation to send its young men to schools and colleges. The recruit is not only being trained for a service which may be demanded of him by the Nation, but at the same time he is being trained in ways which make him a better wage earner.

Fourth. A short term with the colors will also make the officers and men all work harder, and this will be beneficial to their work and to the Army as a whole, and especially will it tend to develop habits of sustained effort and of industry at work given them to perform.

Fifth. The men sent to war must be young men, and, as far as possible, those having either none or few others depending upon their labor for their support; so men should be taken into the active Army as young as possible, kept there for the shortest time possible, and then passed to the reserve.

This question of reserves is important to every mother and father in the country. If there be no reserve, there will be no body of men to mobilize existing organizations, bringing them to war strength and maintaining them during war at this effective strength, and consequently additional volunteer regiments will have to be called for, for troops must somehow be provided. As in the past, volunteer organizations will be raised; the young boys will join and go to the front. In every war we have ever had these volunteers—green boys under inexperienced officers—will lose from 22 to 28 per cent of their regimental strength in their concentration camp before ever going into a campaign; so a regiment with 800 will in a couple of months have lost 200. In all wars the losses in camp are greater than on the battle field. It will then be ordered to the front and in six months will have lost 40 per cent and be reduced to 360 men, as there are no trained men to supply this wastage; another 800-strength regiment will be raised and go through the same losses, while the officers and men are learning the A B C's of the soldier's profession—that of keeping themselves well, properly fed, and properly supplied.

Such was the experience of our past wars, and such will be the experience of our future wars fought by these volunteer soldiers. Can mothers and fathers of this Nation appreciate that the deaths of many of their sons are due to the ignorance of their officers and to the lack of training in their boys? Many a boy has become sick and has died from preventable disease because he did not know how to take care of himself and his officers were too ignorant to show him. Many a boy has been needlessly slaughtered by bullets and exposure because led by untrained officers.

Our future wars will be fought by the young men, but if there is a body of these men who previously have become voluntarily trained not so many of the untrained ones will be needed at the front at once. The reservist will at least have the advantage of joining an organization officered by experienced men, and he will fight by the side of trained men.

From every reason it seems that the expensive personnel serving with the colors should be kept at such a minimum as will provide the instruction for the yearly increment needed to keep full the relatively inexpensive reserve, and that the expensive Army will be used to keep intact in time of peace the organizations needed at once on the outbreak of war, and be used principally as a training school for the great body of men needed to make these organizations effective upon the battle field.

To explain what is meant by an adequate system of reserves: As the infantry is the cheapest of all the arms to maintain and the easiest to supply and obtain, it must form the bulk of any army. A regiment of infantry will be used in this illustration. The base yearly pay of the officers of a regiment of infantry is as follows:

1 colonel	\$4,000
1 lieutenant colonel	3,500
3 majors	9,000
15 captains	36,000
15 first lieutenants	30,000
15 second lieutenants	25,500
1 chaplain	2,400

Total..... 110,400

The base pay of a private is \$15; therefore the base pay of the officers is equal to the base pay of 613 men serving in first enlistment. For economical reasons, then, the enlisted strength in war should be as large as can be effectively handled by the officers. The officers can handle a larger number of trained than untrained men; that is, if trained men are provided, the regiment can have in war from 2,500 to 3,000 men. If trained men are not provided, the enlisted strength will drop to about 1,500. Statistics show that, due to death, wounds, sickness, desertion, and other causes, infantry will lose in a six months' active campaign about 40 per cent of its strength, and that an additional 10 per cent will be needed for its depot troops; or, if an infantry regiment goes to war with 1,500 men, unless some means are provided to supply its wastage, at the end of a six months' campaign it will have but 750 men. All our past wars have shown that we can not by voluntary enlistment, even utilizing the draft and the vicious bounty system, get recruits to supply this wastage, and the result has been that the regiments in the field have often dwindled to less than 300 men, and these regiments remain at the front with their small number of men and large number of higher-priced officers, and that the only way to get additional men to the front was to raise new regiments. This absurd policy has resulted in the great expense of recruiting, equipping, and paying new, untrained men, and sending them to the front under untrained officers, where, when their services are required, the regiment is again only 300 men strong. This is not fancy but a fact, as shown by the records of our Rebellion.

I wish to call to the attention of the Senators who are listening to me the great battle monument in the State of Pennsylvania on the field at Gettysburg. The next time you go there, if you will note the number of organizations representing that State which took part in the Battle of Gettysburg, and the comparatively few men in those organizations, you will find that there were less than 300 men to a regiment present and on duty in the State where the battle took place. If that were true in that State, it must much more certainly be true in other States.

If trained reservists were provided to supply this wastage, the regiments at the front could be kept at their full fighting strength. Fewer men would be required, many less regiments would be raised, and our young sons and relatives would not be sent to the front under inexperienced officers.

Suppose, then, that our Infantry regiments of trained men can be held at a war strength of 2,400, it will need 1,200 trained reservists to furnish the wastage for a six months' campaign and its depot troops. What will be its economic peace strength, provided trained reservists are available to bring it from its economic peace to its effective war strength or to furnish the trained reservists to what, in military parlance, is termed "to mobilize"?

If the peace strength is 1,000 men, 1,400 trained reservists will be needed to mobilize each Infantry regiment and 1,200 to supply and keep it at a full strength of 2,400 men in a six months' active campaign, or a total of 2,600 reservists.

If the time of service with the colors is three years and the strength 1,000 men, then about 300 men will each year be available to pass to the reserve, and 300 into 2,600 equals \$4. As some of the 300 men passed to the reserve will desert or become disabled or unfit for service, to keep the reservists full at 2,600 will probably require nine years' service in the reserve for a three years' service with the colors and a strength of 1,000 men. If the number of men serving with the colors is increased or the time of service with the colors is decreased, then the time of service in the reserve can be shortened. From cost alone it is not advisable to increase the enlisted strength above what is absolutely needed to furnish the yearly quota of trained men to the reserve. Shortening the time with the colors is from every viewpoint the best procedure. More men can be trained; it keeps the men the shortest time from being producers; it makes the officers and men work harder during the two years of service of the enlisted men; the men, after being trained, join the reserve younger; the reservist is less apt to

get married while in the reserve and thus have fewer persons dependent upon him for support; and because with the increased effort demanded he will have developed character which will make him worth more commercially; and, further, if the Government can train him in two years, it would be folly to pay the extra \$326 for another year's superfluous training, when he is an equal asset to the Nation's defense without this time, whether remaining with the colors or in the reserve, and he can be held in the reserve for about one-eighth of what he costs when serving with the colors. If, then, this time is reduced to two years about 500 men will be available each year to pass to the reserve, and 500 into 2,600 equals $5\frac{1}{2}$ or 6 years. But, as the needed reserve is over twice as large as the number of men serving with the colors, the time spent with the colors, whatever its length, will be about one-third of that spent with the reserve. Three things are, then, absolutely necessary in providing for any system of trained reservists.

First. The recruit must be trained in the shortest possible time and he must then be passed to the reserve; that is, not permitted to reenlist in the active Army unless needed as an instructor for other recruits.

Second. Whatever the length of time of service with the colors, the length of service in the reserve must be about three times as long. Hence, any law which will give an adequate reserve must provide for this proportional service.

Third. The reservist must be kept track of, have his clothes, arms, and equipment ready for him at some designated depot, be assigned to some organization, and have a means provided by which, when needed, he can promptly join his depot and be equipped and then promptly forwarded to his organization. To do this the reservist must be paid and classified.

The reservist also should be a young man with the fewest possible depending upon him for their support. The reservists needed to mobilize forming one class, and men needed to supply the six months' wastage forming another, should all be unmarried. Perhaps this is not possible, but it is desirable.

The reservists for depot troops forming a third class will not leave home territory except when other resources of war are exhausted; so they may be married or older men.

The two things which any law looking to the formation of a reserve must do with certainty are: Provide an adequate reserve of trained young men and so hold these reservists as to permit them to pursue in peace their productive labors, but compel a certain and prompt return to their organizations upon the call of the President. No law which contemplates that the return of reservist shall be optional with him can be effective. War plans can only be made when it is certain that our organizations will be at fixed strength of trained men during the continuance of the campaign. The enlistment law recently passed by Congress was good in that it recognized the importance of providing a reserve, but this law can not provide an adequate reserve, and it should be changed at once. It provided a longer time of service with the colors than in the reserve and practically discharged the man after his service with the colors, and provided no means of keeping track of the reservist, and did not pay him; and it can not therefore be effective in carrying out the War Department's plans. How can any law obtain an adequate reserve when the time of service with the colors is less than the time of service in the reserve, and yet the needed reserve is over twice as large as the peace enlisted strength? How can the volunteer reservist be kept track of in peace and compelled to return to his organization in war unless he is paid? How can any system of bounty induce a man to return to any designated organization when he will undoubtedly receive a larger bounty and easier service by going to the volunteers or militia?

Those who framed this bill have tried to justify their action by the answers given by certain of the officers of the Army serving with troops to their question: "Which would you prefer, a short or a long term of enlistment?" Of course, any officer serving with troops would answer, "A long enlistment," for this means to him less work and very well-trained men, whose personal equations are all known to their commander. If the question asked had been: "Which is best for the Nation, a short term with a reserve or a long term of enlistment without a reserve?" the answers would have been very different, even from the officers who have not given very much previous thought to this question of national policy.

It does not require much of a mathematician to see that if one man with the active Army costs as much as eight trained men in the reserve, that an active army of 100,000 men and 200,000 trained reservists can be kept for less money than an active army of 125,000 men and no reserve. The first army will have, with a two-year enlistment, an effective fighting strength when needed in war of about 150,000 trained men,

50,000 men of less than one year's service, and behind it a reserve of 100,000 trained men, sufficient to keep it at its effective strength during a six-months' active campaign. The second army, having no trained reserves, will probably be sent to war with 62,500 trained men, 62,500 men of less than one year's service, and perhaps 50,000 untrained recruits, if they can be obtained—a total of 62,500 trained men, 112,500 untrained or partially trained men—total 175,000, which in six months will be reduced to 87,500.

The War Department has plans for the reorganization of the Army, and will urge that the present organization will be ineffective in war and is very expensive and ill-advised in peace, and these opinions of the War Department are the same as those held by the military experts of all other nations.

If our child is sick, do we accept the diagnosis of the man without even a doctor's certificate, and especially if the diagnosis and remedies suggested are diametrically different from the treatment suggested and followed in similar cases by all the celebrated doctors of the world? Our country is desperately ill with nondevelopment of its military resources. The disease has been clearly diagnosed by experts and all the expert world knows it. They also know the remedy and have prescribed it. The sensible course seems to be to follow the expert treatment prescribed. Our past history shows what a different policy has resulted in military inefficiency, military disaster, immense cost in war, excessive expenditures for pensions.

If the Army is needed at all, its principal use is to furnish a reasonable defense against a probable invasion. To do this it must be of sufficient size and of such organization as will make it effective when opposed to a probable foe. Can anyone believe that our little mobile Regular Army of 31,500 men and no reserves can furnish any adequate defense against the army of any of the great powers? Moneys saved by not developing an adequate defense of size and organization and equipments sufficient for the needs of the country is not an economy. If the defense provided will not function effectively when needed, moneys spent upon it are wasted. Either make it effective in the manner prescribed by our experts or let Congress take full responsibility for its present condition.

Mr. DU PONT. I desire to say to the Senator from Massachusetts that the little mobile army of about 31,000 men of which he speaks has not an adequate number of fieldpieces as compared with muskets. There are only two guns to a thousand muskets. That is another feature which makes it very much less efficient.

Mr. WEEKS. I stated earlier in my remarks that each regiment used as a unit should have with it four to six guns.

Mr. LODGE. What is the average number of guns per thousand men in other armies?

Mr. WEEKS. I think the figures I have read will substantially cover the average number of guns with a unit of men.

Mr. LODGE. I was told that there are seven in the German Army per thousand.

Mr. WEEKS. I have given our regiments at somewhat less.

Mr. LODGE. What is the number in ours, exactly?

Mr. WEEKS. It is rather less than two, I think.

Mr. DU PONT. It is only two in our Army.

Mr. WEEKS. Mr. President, I will return for a moment to our developed military resources. The tables giving the strength of the Regular Army and Organized Militia in the United States show that the militia might, with the hearty cooperation of the State authorities, be organized into 12 tactical divisions, 5 auxiliary divisions, and 6 additional Infantry brigades; but that in order to so organize the militia which can be used in a mobile army it must be increased by about 2,600 officers and 48,000 men, or it should be expanded to the peace strength of 10,164 officers and 152,610 men.

The war strength of these organizations would be 10,164 officers and 282,292 men. It will therefore be necessary to provide a first reserve of 129,682 men in order that the militia may be sent to war at its effective strength or to mobilize it, and another, or second, reserve of 134,000 men and some 4,700 officers to keep the militia at its effective war strength during a six months' campaign.

The Regular Army in the United States can be tactically organized into three divisions and two Cavalry divisions, having a war strength of 2,321 officers and 73,397 men, by providing a slight increase in the peace strength of the Regular Army in both officers and men and providing a reserve of 20,000 men to mobilize. Another reserve of about 34,000 men is required, so that this war strength of the Regular Army may be preserved at about 73,000 men during a six months' active campaign. When the Regular Army and the militia are thus properly or-

ganized and their reserves provided, the developed military strength of the United States will be—

Regular Army	73,400
Organized Militia	282,000
Total	355,400

This force is 150,000 men short of what the military experts of the country believe should be the size of the available organized military force in the United States. While the militia may be a valuable asset and has in its ranks many earnest men with great potential as part of our effective defense, still it never can, under their militia service, become a well-trained and disciplined force, and it would be a crime to send them to the front before they had received in the field the training needed to mechanize them as a fighting force.

It would seem that it would be inadvisable to further expand the militia to obtain this needed 150,000 men—first, because the well-trained troops of the Regular Army, at even the proposed increased size, when expanded to their war strength is too small a force to furnish a sure block to a modern army for the time needed to train the militia, and until this can be done a force of 73,000 Regulars and 282,000 militia, plus the volunteers we might hastily raise, approximates the proportion and condition of the forces that have been beaten by equal numbers in every one of our past wars.

The following garrisons of the authorized Regular Army are serving out of the country, and these can not be considered as part of any developed force which is available for defense of the home territory:

In the Philippine Islands, including about 5,500 Philippine Scouts	17,000
In the Hawaiian Islands	8,000
In Alaska	1,000
In Panama, as soon as quarters are built	3,000
Total	29,000

These garrisons are too small; in fact, it is believed that with the exception of the troops in the Philippines, all the other garrisons will ultimately have to be increased.

It is certainly an altruistic policy which attempts to educate and fit for self-government the people of the Philippines, but this attempt has required the United States to send over 11,000 of its Regular Army to the Philippines and to pay for some 6,000 native troops—a yearly expenditure of some \$10,000,000, if we take the cost of the soldier serving with the colors at \$600 per year; an expenditure of over five and one-half millions, if we consider only the clothing, pay, and food of the soldier. Taking this latter sum, it means 139,000 reserves. I am not criticizing the policy, provided the Nation is willing to pay this cost; but if the policy means that our Regular Army in the United States will, by this altruism, be reduced below what will give the Nation a reasonable defense, the policy is not only dangerous but pernicious.

The garrison of the Sandwich Islands is 8,000, and probably should be increased to 20,000 in order to provide a navy need; that is, to secure harbor and coaling station for our fleet in the Pacific.

The garrison in the Panama Canal Zone must be sufficient to protect this great waterway. The Nation has assumed new responsibilities with reference to the world at large, and the cost of meeting these responsibilities can not be measured by the appropriations made for similar purposes in its younger national life.

It is not for me to prescribe the size of the mobile army in the United States, but rather to invite attention to what is considered by men who have made a study of this question an adequate home defense and to show, if possible, how imperfectly this home defense has been provided. The War Department tells us the country needs for this defense 500,000 trained men, supplemented by from 100,000 to 200,000 volunteers. The Nation has in the United States a mobile Regular Army of 31,500 enlisted strength and an organized mobile militia of about 104,000 enlisted strength and no available trained reserve. Certainly the War Department under these conditions can not be held responsible for the disastrous outcome of an attack made upon this country. The figures presented by the War Department appear rather stupendous, but they are not inconsistent with what this country has been obliged to put in the field in most of its past wars, and until Congress furnishes the means to approximate the demands of the War Department the responsibility for the results of any war must be borne by Congress.

I am firmly impressed with the idea that haphazard legislation has too long been indulged in with reference to the development of our military resources; that the questions of policy, of economy in maintenance, of effectiveness in the costly ma-

chine which we are forced to maintain, have not been intelligently met—certainly they have not been satisfactorily solved.

To quote from an article on "National defense":

If the United States is unwilling to follow all other great nations in their method of providing a trained army, i. e., to require every young man of the Nation to devote one or two years to the training necessary to make of him an efficient unit in the Nation's defense, then the people and Congress must not shrink from the large appropriation necessary to provide an Army by means of voluntary enlistments.

In order that any policy for national defense may be continuing and put in effect it is necessary, first, that a policy be formulated which will be approved by the Nation and by Congress; second, that means be provided so that the general policy when approved will be adhered to and carried out.

This requires some sort of national-defense council, and I am heartily in favor of seeing such a body legislated into prompt existence. Congress then would not be asked to provide for the policies and individual opinion of varying administrations and military committees, which so far have been ineffective and costly, but some definite scheme would be thought out for the economical development and maintenance of that part of our military resources considered necessary for our national defense.

A man can only be an efficient soldier by subjecting himself to that training which will make him one. The Nation lost the vast reserve of soldiers trained by five years of active service in the Civil War; it has no developed professional leaders except those trained in the Regular Army; it has failed to utilize as part of its developed military strength the men who have been trained and discharged from the Regular Army. Our militia, although composed of a fine body of capable men, can not be considered as a whole a reliable fighting force at the outbreak of war. Our Nation has neglected absolutely the lessons taught by its past defective military policy, and is persistent in the policy which our past history has shown to be foolish and exceedingly wasteful in human life and money.

Russia was unprepared for war, and was defeated by a nation less than half of its size in population.

The Turkish Army, which only a few years ago was one of the best in Europe, had been rendered an ineffective fighting machine by diverting the moneys needed to keep it efficient to other purposes; it was crumpled up and vanquished in less than three weeks by nations not considered at all in the same military class.

If the people of this country believe that this great Nation can not support an army of the size sufficient for its defense, it may be within the province of its Representatives to prescribe the size of the army the Nation believes it can afford; but they should then be prepared to assume the responsibility for the Nation's undefended condition. This is perhaps within the province of Congress, but for Congress to dictate the organization of the Army, especially when such is opposed to what all military experts of all nations say, is reprehensible; for, although Congress must assume the responsibility for the condition, it would have no power to avert the disaster which will in war afflict the Nation because of this policy.

Finally, I believe that laws should be passed at once which will reorganize the Regular Army. This reorganization should give to the mobile army the proper proportion of infantry, field artillery, cavalry, engineers, signal, sanitary troops, the needed ammunition and supply trains, and provide for properly equipped depots. The law must provide that the men serve the shortest time with the colors necessary to train them as soldiers, and then pass them as soon as trained to a reserve, and that while serving in this reserve the men must be paid. Make the enlistment age 18 to 21, with consent of parents, and 25 as limit for first enlistment. Permit no man not a commissioned officer, musician, mechanic, horseshoer, bandsman, or one specially recommended as instructor for recruits to reenlist in the line of the mobile army. Provide that soldiers have no legal right to their uniforms or clothing; what they save on the clothing allowance to pass to their credit on discharge as at present, but that upon discharge they must have a serviceable overcoat, service uniform, shoes, and other articles prescribed as field and surplus kit; these to be appraised by a board of officers and their value passed to the man's credit; these clothes to follow the reservist to the depot where he reports on mobilization. Have reservists report their address four times per year, but as the reservist is a trained man it is not necessary to recall him to the colors during the first term of enlistment in the reserve, and he should not be so recalled, but should be permitted to go anywhere in the United States upon giving notification of his new address. If regiments are assigned to certain localities near centers of population, they will draw their recruits from those centers and the reservists will return to their homes. If, however, they do desire to move away, this privilege should be accorded them as a right, the only restriction being that they report four

times a year to their organization commander or to The Adjutant General of the Army, giving their addresses. To provide that service in the reserve shall be at least three times the service with the colors, and this can be best done by dividing the reserve into three classes—the first to be composed of men who will be used to mobilize the organizations, the service in this class to be about three years and the men to be preferably unmarried; second class to be composed of men who will supply the wastage of a six months' campaign, service in this class to be three years and the men to be preferably unmarried; the third class to form the depot troops, service in this class to be approximately three years.

A similar reserve to be provided for the militia, and as this reserve is a Federal and not a State asset the militia reserve should also be paid by the National Government. Laws should also be passed to provide trained commissioned officers for the reserve and for such volunteers as may be needed. A fine body of such reserve commissioned officers can probably be obtained from the discharged noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army or from the graduates at West Point, if the plan I have suggested were put into operation, by paying them such part of \$300 as may be needed to purchase their uniforms and equipments.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Does the Senator mean there that each man after discharge from the Army should serve for nine years in the reserve or for only three years?

Mr. WEEKS. He may pass on from one reserve to another, but he serves as a first reservist for three years.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. After three years in the reserve, he retires absolutely from it?

Mr. WEEKS. Yes; if he wishes to do so, or he may continue in the second reserve or the third reserve. That is to be optional.

Mr. MARTINE of New Jersey. Mr. President, the Senate has just listened to a most highly instructive and interesting address by the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WEEKS]. The subject of that address is one of vital importance, and one which at the present time agitates the Nation from one end of it to the other. It seems to me that it could hardly have too extensive a circulation, and I move that 2,000 pamphlet copies of the address be printed.

Mr. SMOOT. Mr. President, I dislike to interpose an objection to the request of the Senator from New Jersey that the address of the Senator from Massachusetts be printed as a public document. I am perfectly willing that it should be printed in congressional form by the Senate. It has been the rule of this body, and it is also agreed between the House and the Senate, that speeches which are delivered in the Senate or in the House shall not be printed as public documents. For that reason, and that reason only, I object now to the request.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Mr. President, the speech delivered by the Senator from Massachusetts is already a public document; it will be printed in the Record; but if we start special orders for the printing of Senators' speeches in document form we will have similarly to print every Senator's speech. I have been here three years, and nothing of that sort has ever been done during that time. So I object. I do so, however, with the highest regard for the Senator from Massachusetts and for his speech. I would object if it were a speech of the Senator from Indiana [Mr. KERN] or of any other Senator on the floor of the Senate. I do not think we ought to do it.

Mr. MARTINE of New Jersey. Very well, but I feel that the subject is one of vital importance.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Objection is made.

DEATH OF REPRESENTATIVE SERENO E. PAYNE.

A message from the House of Representatives, by J. C. South, its Chief Clerk, communicated to the Senate the intelligence of the death of Hon. SERENO E. PAYNE, a Representative from the State of New York, and transmitted resolutions of the House thereon, including an invitation to the Vice President and the Senate to attend the funeral of the deceased Representative in the House of Representatives, to be held on Sunday, December 13, 1914, at 11 o'clock a. m.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair lays before the Senate resolutions from the House of Representatives, which will be read.

The Secretary read the resolutions, as follows:

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
December 11, 1914.

Resolved, That the House has heard with profound sorrow of the death of Hon. SERENO ELISHA PAYNE, a Representative from the State of New York.

Resolved, That a committee of the House be appointed to take order for superintending the funeral of Mr. PAYNE in the House of Representatives at 11 o'clock a. m. on Sunday, December 13, 1914, and that the House of Representatives attend the same.

Resolved, That as a further mark of respect the remains of Mr. PAYNE be removed from Washington to Auburn, N. Y., in charge of the Sergeant at Arms, attended by the committee, who shall have full power to carry these resolutions into effect, and that the necessary expenses in connection therewith be paid out of the contingent fund of the House.

Resolved, That the Clerk of the House communicate these proceedings to the Senate and invite the Vice President and the Senate to attend the funeral in the House of Representatives and to appoint a committee to act with the committee of the House.

Resolved, That invitations be extended to the President of the United States and the members of his Cabinet, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Diplomatic Corps (through the Secretary of State), the Admiral of the Navy, and the Chief of Staff of the Army to attend the funeral in the House of Representatives.

Resolved, That as a further mark of respect this House do now adjourn.

In accordance with the foregoing resolution the Speaker appointed the following committee: Mr. FITZGERALD, Mr. UNDERWOOD, Mr. MANN, Mr. JONES, Mr. TALBOTT of Maryland, Mr. COOPER, Mr. GILLET, Mr. BARTHOLOMEW, Mr. BARTLETT, Mr. BUTLER, Mr. GREENE of Massachusetts, Mr. HAMILTON of Michigan, Mr. MONDELL, Mr. FORDNEY, Mr. MURDOCK, Mr. GARDNER, Mr. MOORE, Mr. KITCHIN, Mr. RAINEY, Mr. DIXON, Mr. HULL, Mr. HAMMOND, Mr. SLOAN, and Mr. BROWN, Mr. O'LEARY, Mr. WILSON, Mr. DALE, Mr. MAHER, Mr. CALDER, Mr. GRIFFIN, Mr. O'BRIEN, Mr. METZ, Mr. RIORDAN, Mr. GOLDFOGLE, Mr. LEVY, Mr. CONRY, Mr. DOOLING, Mr. CAREW, Mr. PATTEN, Mr. CHANDLER, Mr. CANTOR, Mr. GEORGE, Mr. BRUCKNER, Mr. GOULDEN, Mr. OGLESBY, Mr. TAYLOR, Mr. PLATT, Mr. MCCLELLAN, Mr. TEN EYCK, Mr. PARKER, Mr. WALLIN, Mr. MOTT, Mr. TALCOTT, Mr. FAIRCHILD, Mr. CLANCY, Mr. UNDERHILL, Mr. DUNN, Mr. DANFORTH, Mr. GITTINS, Mr. SMITH, Mr. DRISCOLL, Mr. HAMILTON, and Mr. LOFT, of New York.

Mr. O'GORMAN. Mr. President, I have to convey to the Senate the sad intelligence of the death of an illustrious citizen of the State of New York, who was concluding his thirtieth year of useful and distinguished service in the House of Representatives, the Hon. SERENO E. PAYNE. In connection with this announcement I submit the resolutions which I send to the desk, and ask their adoption.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolutions will be read.

The resolutions (S. Res. 499) were read, considered by unanimous consent, and unanimously agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That the Senate has heard with profound sorrow the announcement of the death of Hon. SERENO ELISHA PAYNE, late a Representative from the State of New York.

Resolved, That a committee of 10 Senators be appointed by the Vice President, to join a committee appointed by the House of Representatives, to take order for the superintending of the funeral of the deceased.

Resolved, That the Senate accept the invitation of the House of Representatives extended to the President of the Senate and the Senate to attend the funeral of the deceased, to be held in the Hall of the House of Representatives at 11 o'clock a. m. on Sunday next, December 13, 1914.

Resolved, That the Secretary communicate a copy of these resolutions to the House of Representatives.

The VICE PRESIDENT appointed under the second resolution as the committee on the part of the Senate Mr. Root, Mr. O'GORMAN, Mr. CLARK of Wyoming, Mr. MARTINE of New Jersey, Mr. BRANDEGEE, Mr. ASHURST, Mr. LODGE, Mr. SMITH of Georgia, Mr. NELSON, and Mr. BANKHEAD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair notices that in the resolutions of the House the Vice President, among others, is invited to attend the funeral ceremonies of the late Representative from the State of New York. That the Vice President may not be conspicuous by his absence, it is necessary to state that he has an engagement for Sunday next, which will call him out of the city on that day. The Vice President does not desire that his absence should be taken as a mark of disrespect to the deceased or of any discourtesy to the invitation.

Mr. O'GORMAN. Mr. President, I move, as a further mark of respect to the memory of the deceased, that the Senate do now adjourn.

The motion was unanimously agreed to; and (at 1 o'clock and 30 minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned until to-morrow, Saturday, December 12, 1914, at 12 o'clock meridian.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

FRIDAY, December 11, 1914.

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Henry N. Couden, D. D., offered the following prayer:

O Lord God Almighty, Creator and Father of all souls, Thy will is supreme, and Thy will is good will, for Thou dost love Thy children and satisfiest the longing souls with hopes and aspirations, and leadest them on in thoughts and deeds which live after them. A great sorrow has come to this House in the death of a strong man, firm in his convictions, pure in his motives, which endeared him to all who knew him, and who for years has held a conspicuous place on the floor of this House. In the committees to which he was assigned his counsel was sought. A statesman who served with all vigor and wisdom his State and Nation, SERENO E. PAYNE will live; his going will

be mourned by his people and by all with whom he came in contact.

We thank Thee for his life, for his character, and what he did. Comfort us and his family in the everlasting hope of the immortality of the soul. Help us to follow his example, to emulate his virtues, and cherish his memory. And teach us the value of well doing, and guide us by Thine own counsels, that we may leave the impress of our character on those who shall come after us. "A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches, and loving favor rather than silver and gold." So keep us all in the way of righteousness, and bring us at last into Thine everlasting kingdom. In the spirit of the Lord Jesus Christ. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

SENATE BILL REFERRED.

Under clause 2, Rule XXIV, Senate bill of the following title was taken from the Speaker's table and referred to its appropriate committee, as indicated below:

S. 2335. An act to provide for the register and enrollment of vessels built in foreign countries when such vessels have been wrecked on the coasts of the United States or her possessions or adjacent waters and salvaged by American citizens and repaired in American shipyards; to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

HOOR OF MEETING ON SATURDAY.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns to-day it adjourn to meet at 11 o'clock to-morrow morning.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from New York [Mr. FITZGERALD] asks unanimous consent that when the House adjourns to-day it adjourn to meet at 11 o'clock to-morrow morning. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

RECESS.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the House take a recess for 30 minutes.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from New York asks unanimous consent that the House take a recess for 30 minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 8 minutes p. m.) the House stood in recess.

The recess having expired, the House resumed its session.

SUNDAY SESSION.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns on Saturday it adjourn to meet at 10.30 o'clock a. m. on Sunday.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from New York asks unanimous consent that when the House adjourns on Saturday it adjourn to meet at 10.30 o'clock a. m. on Sunday. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

DEATH OF REPRESENTATIVE PAYNE.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Speaker, it becomes my sad duty to announce to the House the death of my colleague, the dean of the House and one of its most distinguished Members, the Hon. SERENO E. PAYNE, who passed away last night at his residence in this city. At some future time I shall ask the House to set aside a date to be devoted to the delivery of eulogies upon the life, character, and public services of the deceased. At present I offer the resolutions which I send to the Clerk's desk.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the resolutions.

The Clerk read as follows:

House resolution 673.

Resolved, That the House has heard with profound sorrow of the death of Hon. SERENO ELISHA PAYNE, a Representative from the State of New York.

Resolved, That a committee of the House be appointed to take order for superintending the funeral of Mr. PAYNE in the House of Representatives at 11 o'clock a. m. on Sunday, December 13, instant, and that the House of Representatives attend the same.

Resolved, That as a further mark of respect the remains of Mr. PAYNE be removed from Washington to Auburn, N. Y., in charge of the Sergeant at Arms, attended by the committee, who shall have full power to carry these resolutions into effect, and that the necessary expenses in connection therewith be paid out of the contingent fund of the House.

Resolved, That the Clerk of the House communicate these proceedings to the Senate and invite the Vice President and the Senate to attend the funeral in the House of Representatives and to appoint a committee to act with the committee of the House.

Resolved, That invitations be extended to the President of the United States and the members of his Cabinet, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Diplomatic Corps (through the Secretary of State), the Admiral of the Navy, and the Chief of Staff of the Army to attend the funeral in the House of Representatives.

The resolution was agreed to, and the Speaker announced as the committee on the part of the House Mr. FITZGERALD, Mr. UNDERWOOD, Mr. MANN, Mr. JONES, Mr. TALBOTT of Maryland, Mr. COOPER, Mr. GILLET, Mr. BARTHOLOTT, Mr. BARTLETT, Mr. BUTLER, Mr. GREENE of Massachusetts, Mr. HAMILTON of Michigan, Mr. MONDELL, Mr. FORDNEY, Mr. MURDOCK, Mr. GARDNER, Mr. MOORE, Mr. KITCHIN, Mr. RAINEY, Mr. DIXON, Mr. HULL, Mr. HAMMOND, Mr. SLOAN, Mr. BROWN of New York, Mr. O'LEARY, Mr. WILSON of New York, Mr. DALE, Mr. MAHER, Mr. CALDER, Mr. GRIFFIN, Mr. O'BRIEN, Mr. METZ, Mr. RIORDAN, Mr. GOLDFOGLE, Mr. LEVY, Mr. CONRY, Mr. DOOLING, Mr. CAREW, Mr. PATTEN of New York, Mr. CHANDLER of New York, Mr. CANTOR, Mr. GEORGE, Mr. BRUCKNER, Mr. GOULDEN, Mr. OGLESBY, Mr. TAYLOR of New York, Mr. PLATT, Mr. MCCLELLAN, Mr. TEN EYCK, Mr. PARKER of New York, Mr. WALLIN, Mr. MOTT, Mr. TALCOTT of New York, Mr. FAIRCHILD, Mr. CLANCY, Mr. UNDERHILL, Mr. DUNN, Mr. DANFORTH, Mr. GITTINGS, Mr. SMITH of New York, Mr. DRISCOLL, Mr. HAMILTON of New York, and Mr. LOFT.

ADJOURNMENT.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the last resolution. The Clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That as a further mark of respect this House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 38 minutes p. m.) the House adjourned until Saturday, December 12, 1914, at 11 o'clock a. m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1. A letter from the Secretary of War, submitting an item of legislation to meet requirements in the completion of the fortifications of the Panama Canal (H. Doc. No. 1338); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

2. A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting detailed statements of disbursements by the Department of Commerce and Labor for 1912 and 1913, and Department of Commerce for 1914 (H. Doc. No. 1339); to the Committee on Expenditures in the Department of Commerce and ordered to be printed.

3. A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting report of the Bureau of War-Risk Insurance, under provision of section 10, Document No. 193, Sixty-third Congress (H. Doc. No. 1340); to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries and ordered to be printed.

4. A letter from the Secretary of War, transmitting, with a letter from the Chief of Engineers, reports on preliminary examination and survey of Buzzards Bay, Mass., with a view to the removal of Cleveland Ledge and other obstructions to such depth as will be suitable for vessels using the Cape Cod Canal; also with a view to providing a depth of 25 feet up to the dredged channel in the harbor of New Bedford, Mass. (H. Doc. No. 1341); to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors and ordered to be printed, with illustrations.

PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII,

Mr. ASWELL introduced a bill (H. R. 19813) to create the Red River commission and to define its duties, which was referred to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ADAIR: A bill (H. R. 19814) granting an increase of pension to Henry R. Buckmaster; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19815) granting an increase of pension to Joseph A. Ellis; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19816) granting a pension to Charles E. Faux; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. ASHBROOK: A bill (H. R. 19817) granting a pension to Nettie B. Shores; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BOOHER: A bill (H. R. 19818) granting a pension to Mahala Burns; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19819) granting an increase of pension to John T. Warburton; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BURKE of Wisconsin: A bill (H. R. 19820) for the relief of Guy C. Pierce; to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. CAMPBELL: A bill (H. R. 19821) granting an increase of pension to Elias Worley; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. ESCH: A bill (H. R. 19822) granting a pension to George W. Stanford; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HINEBAUGH: A bill (H. R. 19823) granting a pension to Daniel Mason; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HOWARD: A bill (H. R. 19824) for the relief of the heirs of Benjamin Burdett, deceased; to the Committee on War Claims.

Also, a bill (H. R. 19825) for the relief of the heirs of William H. Clarke; to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. LINTHICUM: A bill (H. R. 19826) granting a pension to Martha A. Kaiser; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. MOSS of West Virginia: A bill (H. R. 19827) granting an increase of pension to Lydia M. Fleming; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SLAYDEN: A bill (H. R. 19828) for the relief of the Longini Mexican Hat Co., of San Antonio, Tex.; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. STEPHENS of Texas: A bill (H. R. 19829) for the relief of J. G. Seupelt; to the Committee on Indian Affairs.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By Mr. ASHBROOK: Evidence to accompany House bill 18949, for the relief of Jacob A. Thuma; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BAILEY: Petition of business men of Bedford, Pa., favoring the passage of House bill 5308, relative to taxing mail-order houses; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CARY: Petition of Order of Railway Conductors and Brotherhoods of Railroad Trainmen, Locomotive Engineers and Firemen, favoring passage of House bill 17894, relative to boiler inspection, etc.; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, petition of S. E. Tate Printing Co., of Milwaukee, Wis., protesting against new contract for printing return envelopes by the Government; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. GERRY: Petition of Sidney F. Hoar Camp, No. 4, United Spanish War Veterans, Providence, R. I., and Westerly Board of Trade, Westerly, R. I., relative to national defense; to the Committee on Rules.

Also, petition of Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Apponaug, R. I., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania: Petition of Western Association of Short Line Railroads, protesting against H. R. 17042, changing the basis of mail transportation; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of 20 citizens of Philadelphia, Pa., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. HOUSTON: Petition of citizens of Petersburg, Tenn., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. MAHER: Petition of citizens of Brooklyn, N. Y., favoring the passage of the Hamill bill, H. R. 5139; to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

By Mr. RAINEY: Petition of Methodist Episcopal Church of Hull, Ill., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. SCULLY: Petition of citizens of Ocean Grove and Barnegat, N. J., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. SMITH of Minnesota: Memorial of Arthur MacArthur Camp, No. 15, Department of Minnesota, United Spanish War Veterans, indorsing House bill for inquiry into conditions of military and naval forces of the United States; to the Committee on Rules.

SENATE.

SATURDAY, December 12, 1914.

The Chaplain, Rev. Forrest J. Prettyman, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, we know Thee in the renewing of our lives as we seek the center and source of all truth. Our approach into Thy presence is the gateway into that infinite calm and peace for which our spirits were made. Glorify Thyself in this moment of prayer that out of it we may carry the glory and fervor of divine inspiration. A day in Thy court is better than a thousand. A moment's lifting up of our hearts to God gives to us an outlook of infinite possibility.

The Nation is called upon to-day to mourn the loss of a statesman. We bless God for laying His hand upon men who are furnished for every good word and work. We thank Thee